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ABS TRACT
Game theory suggests an anti-cancer treatment based on the use of modified cancer cells that disrupt
cooperation within the tumor. Cancer cells are harvested from the patient, the genes for the production
of essential growth factors are knocked out in vitro and the cells are then reinserted in the tumor, where
they lead to its collapse.
Background and objectives: Current anti-cancer drugs and treatments based on gene therapy are prone
to the evolution of resistance, because cancer is a process of clonal selection: resistant cell lines have a
selective advantage and therefore increase in frequency, eventually conferring resistance to the whole
tumor and leading to relapse. An effective treatment must be evolutionarily stable, that is, immune to
the invasion of resistant mutant cells. This study shows how such a treatment can be achieved by
autologous cell therapy using modified cancer cells, knocked out for genes coding for diffusible factors
like growth factors.
Methodology: The evolutionary dynamics of a population of cells producing diffusible factors are
analyzed using a nonlinear public goods game in a structured population in which the interaction
neighborhood and the update neighborhood are decoupled. The analysis of the dynamics of the system
reveals what interventions can drive the population to a stable equilibrium in which no diffusible factors
are produced.
Results: A treatment based on autologous knockout cell therapy can be designed to lead to the spon-
taneous collapse of a tumor, without targeting directly the cancer cells, their growth factors or their
receptors. Critical parameters that can make the therapy effective are identified. Concepts from evolu-
tionary game theory and mechanism design, some of which are counterintuitive, can be adopted to
optimize the treatment.
Conclusions and implications: Although it shares similarities with other approaches based on gene
therapy and RNA interference, the method suggested here is evolutionarily stable under certain condi-
tions. This method, named autologous cell defection, can be carried out using existing molecular
biology and cell therapy techniques.
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The development of anti-cancer therapies normally
begins with the identification of a molecule or path-
way that is necessary for the development of the
tumor and continues with the design of a method
to target that molecule or pathway. Antiangiogenic
therapies are a case in point [1]: it has long been
known that oxygen concentration decreases with
distance from a capillary [2, 3]; this led to the hypoth-
esis that tumors cannot grow without inducing the
formation of new blood vessels [4–6] and that dis-
rupting neoangiogenesis could be an anti-cancer
therapy [7]; the search for the ‘tumor angiogenesis
factor’ lead to the identification of VEGF (vascular
endothelial growth factor) as the primary respon-
sible for neoangiogenesis [8, 9] and the eventual de-
velopment of a monoclonal antibody targeting
VEGF. A humanized variant of this anti-VEGF anti-
body led to the development of bevacizumab
(Avastin; Genentech) [10], which was for a long time
Roche’s best selling drug, with revenues in excess of
5 billion USD per year.
Unfortunately, even such a blockbuster drug
can only extend survival for patients with certain
types of cancer by a few months on average [11],
far from being a cure for cancer. Overall mortality
rates for cancer are still at levels comparable with
half a century ago [12, 13], as chemotherapy, radio-
therapy and surgery still account for the majority of
treatments.
The problem with most current anti-cancer treat-
ments is that cancer is a process of clonal selection
within the body on the timescale of an individual’s
lifetime [14–18], and mutant cell lines that are resist-
ant to treatments can spread and eventually confer
resistance to the whole tumor. This is why even the
most modern anti-cancer drugs generally lead to re-
lapse after few months, including modern drugs
that, like Avastin, target growth factors [11, 19].
Gene therapy that uses small hairpin RNA
(shRNA) to silence genes for growth factors faces
similar problems and the expectations of RNA inter-
ference (RNAi) for anti-cancer treatments have been
disappointing so far [20, 21]. The evolution of resist-
ance is a problem for all current anti-cancer treat-
ments, including modern approaches that, like
antiangiogenic drugs and RNAi-based therapies, tar-
get growth factors. We need evolutionarily stable
anti-cancer therapies. Little attention (if any), how-
ever, is devoted to understanding the evolutionary
stability of treatments [22].
Here, we reverse the process of drug discovery by
starting from an analysis of the dynamics of tumor
development. Our scope is to identify conditions
that would make a treatment stable against mutant
cell lines; only then will we look at possible molecular
tools to achieve the desired effect. Our starting point
is therefore not the molecular biology of cancer, but
the evolutionary dynamics of cancer. We focus on
the production of growth factors by cancer cells, one
of the hallmarks of cancer [23] and we start from the
evolutionary game theory of growth factor produc-
tion. More properly, the analysis is relevant to diffus-
ible factors (including growth factors) that promote
cell proliferation and survival.
Game theory is the branch of mathematics that
studies strategic interactions, that is, interactions in
which a player’s pay-off depends not only on his own
decisions, but also on the other players’ decision
[24]. In the case of tumor progression, game theory
is relevant to the study of growth factor production,
because the growth factors produced by a cell diffuse
and can be used by neighboring cells, raising a
collective action problem; nonproducer cells can
free-ride on the growth factors produced by their
neighbors. Why then non-producing cells do not in-
crease in frequency? These are typical issues studied
by game theory. Although traditional game theory in
economics assumes rational decisions and learning,
in evolutionary game theory [25] rationality is
replaced by the process of natural selection: the in-
dividuals that are programed to take the best ‘deci-
sion’ leave more progeny and increase in frequency
within the population. Evolutionary game theory can
help us understand the dynamics of diffusible fac-
tor production and identify which states of the popu-
lation (of cancer cells) are stable under which
conditions.
We can then go one step further and ask what can
be done to change these dynamics; that is, we can
study the mechanism design of anti-cancer
therapies. Whereas game theory starts from a given
problem (the game) and predicts the outcome,
mechanism design can be thought of as a reverse
game theory. The question is: how should we change
the rules of the game in order to achieve the desired
outcome? Mechanism design is traditionally used in
Economics [26], for example, to design auctions and
contracts or to understand what an institution can
do in order to induce selfish individuals to contribute
to a public good. Mechanism design in medicine
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needs to achieve the opposite: what should a treat-
ment do in order to impair the production of diffus-
ible factors by tumor cells?
What modern cancer treatments try to achieve,
targeting growth factors, their genes or their recep-
tors, is equivalent to reducing the availability of a
public good. Although this may seem, at first sight,
a rational strategy if one wants to reduce the growth
of a tumor, we will show that this is not necessarily
the case and we will describe different methods that
can lead to an evolutionarily stable therapy. The
method proposed here relies on autologous cell
therapy: cells are harvested from the patient and
genes coding for diffusible factors are knocked out;
these modified cancer cells are then reintroduced
in the tumor in order to modify the dynamics
of the production of the factors coded by the knock-
out genes. Our scope is to show that, for certain
parameters, such treatment is evolutionarily
stable, that is, immune to the invasion of resistant
cell lines.
METHODOLOGY
We use a public goods game in the framework of
evolutionary game theory. A cell can be a produ-
cer (+/+) or a nonproducer (—/—) of a diffusible
factor. Producers pay a cost c that nonproducers
do not pay (0< c< 1). A cell (producer or nonpro-
ducer) benefits from the diffusible factors
produced by all the cells in its group (of size n).
The benefit b(j) for a cell is given by the logistic
function V(j) = 1/[1+e-s(j-k)/ n] of the number j of
+/+ cells among the other cells (apart from self)
in the group, normalized using a standard nor-
malization [27]: b(j) = [V(j)-V(0)]/[V(n)-V(0)]. Using
a logistic curve implies that, as is typical for bio-
logical molecules, including growth factors
produced by cancer cells, the benefit has a sig-
moid shape [28–30], with a synergistic increase
for j< k and diminishing returns for j> k, where
k is the inflection point of the benefit function (it
is useful to define h = k/n); the parameter s con-
trols the steepness of the function at the inflec-
tion point. Although the logistic function is a
typical sigmoid function, we do not limit the ana-
lysis to a specific benefit function, but allow many
possible shapes: k!n gives strictly increasing re-
turns and k!0 strictly diminishing returns,
whereas s!1 models a threshold PGG and
s!0 models linear benefit (the N-person pris-
oner’s dilemma).
In an infinite, well-mixed population, the pay-offs
of producers and of nonproducers are given by
CðxÞ ¼
Xn1
j¼0
n 1
j
 
xjð1 xÞn1j  bðj+1Þ  c
DðxÞ ¼
Xn1
j¼0
n 1
j
 
xjð1 xÞn1j  bðjÞ,
respectively, where 0 x 1 is the fraction of produ-
cers in the population, as a producer pays a cost c
that a nonproducer does not pay, but its group has
one more contributor (itself). The replicator dy-
namics is given by
_x ¼ xð1 xÞ  ½ðxÞ  c,
where the pay-off differenceCðxÞ  DðxÞ is written
in the form ðxÞ  c and
ðxÞ ¼
Xn1
j¼0
n 1
j
 
xjð1 xÞn1j bj
Although analyzing the gradient of selection of the
replicator dynamics for well-mixed populations
helps understand the logic of the problem [30], a
realistic analysis of the dynamics of diffusible factors
within a tumor must resort to a model of interactions
in a spatially structured population.
A spatially structured population is modeled here
as a two-dimensional regular lattice obtained using a
modification of the GridGraph implementation in
Mathematica version 8.0 (Wolfram Research Inc.)
connecting opposing edges to form a toroidal net-
work, in order to avoid edge effects. As in the stand-
ard approach, individuals occupy the nodes of the
network (population size is fixed at 900) and social
interactions proceed along the edges connecting the
nodes. Different from the standard approach, how-
ever (in which an individual’s group is limited to her
one-step neighbors and an individual plays multiple
games centered on each of her neighbors [31]), here
there is no reason to assume that the diffusion range
of the public good is limited to a cell’s one-step
neighbors. The interaction neighborhood and the
update neighborhood are therefore decoupled: a
cell’s group (of size n) is not limited to her one-step
neighbors but is defined by the diffusion range (d) of
the diffusible factor, that is, the number of edges
between the focal cell and the most distant cell
whose contribution affects the fitness of the focal
cell. A cell’s pay-off is a function of the amount of
factor produced by the group she belongs to. The
process starts with a number of nonproducer cells
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placed on the graph; at each round a cell xwith a pay-
off Px is selected (at random) for update (death); in a
deterministic approach, the neighboring cell with
the highest pay-off will replace x. In a stochastic ap-
proach, a cell y (with a pay-off Py) is chosen among
x’s neighbors. IfPx>Py, no update occurs, whereas if
Px< Py, x will adopt y’s strategy with a probability
given by (Py - Px)/ M, where M ensures the proper
normalization and is given by the maximum pos-
sible difference between the pay-offs of x and y [31].
Results are obtained averaging the final 200 of 1000
generations per cell, averaged over 10 different runs.
RESULTS
A tumor can be thought of as a population of indi-
viduals facing a collective action problem for the pro-
duction of a public good. Consider a population of
cells (+/+) that produce a growth factor. If a mutant
cell arises (—/—) that does not produce the growth
factor, that cell and its descendants will still be able
to use the growth factors produced by the
surrounding+/+ cells. Such a PGG can have two
types of equilibria (Fig. 1). In the first type of equilib-
rium, the +/+ cells and the / cells coexist.
Heterogeneity of cells within a tumor is actually well
documented for many types of cancers and many
distinguishable phenotypes [32]. When one reduces
the amount of a growth factor either by making it less
available (using drugs like Avastin) or by targeting its
gene product (using RNAi), the immediate result is,
as expected, a sudden reduction in tumor growth. At
the same time, however, one increases the amount of
growth factors that must be produced, that is, the
threshold necessary for the population to grow
(because some of that growth factor is degraded or
made unavailable by the treatment), thereby
increasing the equilibrium frequency of +/+ cells.
Unless the current (pre-treatment) equilibrium is
below the new (post-treatment) unstable equilib-
rium, the population will adjust to the new conditions
and reach a new stable equilibrium (Fig. 1).
Beside the mixed equilibrium in which+/+ and
—/— cells coexist, PGGs usually have another type of
Figure 1. Difference between therapies that target growth factors and autologous cell therapy. (A) Targeting diffusible factors
directly increases the threshold (h) of the PGG; as a consequence the system has new internal equilibria (empty circle: unstable;
filled circle: stable). The therapy is successful (dotted line: the+/+cells go extinct) only if the new unstable equilibrium (dark blue;
h = 0.8) is above the previous stable equilibrium (gray; h = 0.4); if this is not the case the system will move to the new internal
equilibrium (light blue; h = 0.6). (B) Autologous cell therapy does not rely on changing the benefit function of the diffusible factor,
but must introduce a critical amount of/ cells in order to destabilize the equilibrium and move the fraction of+/+below the
unstable equilibrium, after which the+/+cells will go extinct. In all cases, the dynamics assume a well-mixed population with
n = 50, s= 10, h = 0.4
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equilibrium, in which the —/— cells replace entirely
the +/+ cells (Fig. 1). This is what we want to
achieve. Under certain conditions a population will
evolve spontaneously to this latter equilibrium.
What we want to do is create such conditions and
let the populations spontaneously evolve to the equi-
librium. In the simplest case, the correct conditions
can be achieved simply by introducing in the tumor
enough —/— cells (Fig. 2).
The critical amount of —/— cells depends on the
number of diffusible factors that have been knocked
out (i.e. the relative cost of producing the growth
factors), on the number of cells within their diffusion
range (i.e. group size) and on the shape of the
Figure 2. Introducing a critical amount of/ cells can lead the population to collapse. The plots show frequencies and fitness
over time (the bold line is the average of 10 simulations) and the lattices show snapshots of the population at different times. If
the initial fraction of+/+cells is locally below the unstable internal equilibrium (case b), clonal selection will spontaneously lead
to the increase in frequency of/ cells and to the consequent collapse of the tumor for lack of essential diffusible factors; if not
(case a), the original equilibrium frequencies will persist. Stochastic update, s= 20, h = 0.7, c = 0.1, d = 5
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benefit function (i.e. h and s). A —/— cell has a select-
ive advantage over a+/+cell if the number of+/+
cells in the group is far from k, such that the differ-
ence in benefit between a+/+and a —/— cell is lower
than the cost paid by the+/+cell (Fig. 3). In a well-
mixed population the frequency of+/+cells declines
to zero only if it is below the unstable internal thresh-
old (Fig. 1), whereas for higher frequencies of+/+,
the population converges to the internal stable equi-
librium, because the advantage of the —/— type de-
clines as the frequency of +/+ type decline. In a
spatially structured population, however,
frequencies change only locally, within groups at
the interface between+/+ and —/— cells, because
these groups change in position as the —/— cells re-
place the+/+cells. In a spatially structured popula-
tion,—/— cells can go to fixation even for values of the
threshold that in a well-mixed population would lead
to a stable coexistence of+/+and —/—. Under cer-
tain conditions, however, even if one introduces a
large number of—/— cells, the system can evolve to a
stable equilibrium in which+/+persist (Fig. 4). In
these cases, one must adopt additional strategies to
achieve conditions that are conductive to the desired
dynamics and equilibrium (the extinction of +/+
cells).
The first approach we can use is to extend the
diffusion range of the diffusible factor. This is
equivalent to increasing the number of cells that
benefit from the production of a cell’s diffusible fac-
tors. We know from the theory (Fig. 5; see also [27])
that the provision of diffusible factors is less efficient
in larger groups and that if group size is large
enough, cooperation collapses. The diffusion range
of the diffusible factor may be extended in a number
of ways: by disrupting the binding molecules on the
extra-cellular matrix or the binding domains on the
diffusible factors; by adding soluble binding do-
mains to saturate the binding molecules on the
extra-cellular matrix or the binding domains on the
diffusible factors or by increasing the amount of
long-range isoforms of the factors. What these bind-
ing molecules and isoforms are, and more in general
how to achieve this, depends on the type of tumor
and diffusible factor. It is important to point out that
the amount and efficacy of circulating diffusible fac-
tors and of their receptors remains the same, be-
cause one cell’s factors diffuse further away, but
that cell receives additional factors from other cells,
whose factors also diffuse further. The evolutionary
response of the population, however, changes
because group size changes and it can lead to the
Figure 3. Details of a part of the population in Fig. 2 at t= 50 show the difference between the case in which the fraction of+/+
cells is locally above (a) or below (b) the internal unstable equilibrium. When a cell (black) dies, the adjacent cells (thick edges)
compete to replace that cell’s node (only two competing cells are shown here); a / cell (yellow) does not pay the cost of
producing diffusible factors, but is surrounded by more/ cells than a+/+cell (blue); in case a, the advantage in benefit for a
+/+cell is large enough to offset the cost (here c = 0.1); in case b, this advantage is not large enough. Only in case b will the
population evolve to the pure / equilibrium. Stochastic update, s= 20, h = 0.7, c = 0.1, d= 5
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(evolutionarily stable) equilibrium in which all cells
are —/— (Fig. 5).
Another possible enhancement is the temporary
provision of exogenous diffusible factors (Fig. 6).
This seems the opposite of what a drug should do.
The logic here is to increase the cost/benefit ratio of
producing endogenous diffusible factor by reducing
the relative benefit of its production (or, in other
words, to reduce the threshold of+/+ cells neces-
sary for the diffusible factor to produce a given bene-
fit). Even though the amount of available diffusible
factor increases temporarily, growth rates will not
increase much because of diminishing returns
(assuming the benefit of diffusible factors is a sig-
moid function of its concentration) and even if
growth rates may suddenly increase, the crucial
point is that the fraction of+/+ cells will immedi-
ately start to decrease and reach a new equilibrium.
Our goal is to make this new equilibrium lower than
the original unstable equilibrium. At this point, the
system will be in the domain of attraction of the
equilibrium in which all cells are —/— (Fig. 1), and
when the external provision of diffusible factors is
interrupted, the fraction of+/+cells will decline to
zero (Fig. 6).
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The method suggested here can be considered a
type of gene therapy, harvesting autologous cancer
cells from a patient and genetically modifying them
in vitro (knocking out genes coding for diffusible fac-
tors, rather than adding genes) before reinserting
them in vivo. An appropriate name could be cell de-
fection (for defective cells and for defector strategy).
The basic idea is to fight cancer using modified
cancer cells that are defective for the production of
essential diffusible factors. As these modified cells
(—/—) do not produce the diffusible factors but can
still use (at no cost) the factors produced by their
neighbors, they have a replication advantage over
the+/+ cells and will increase in frequency, like a
tumor within the tumor. Eventually, the tumor will
collapse (or slow down in growth) for lack of essen-
tial diffusible factors. In practice, our goal is to use
modified cancer cells as free riders to induce a ‘tra-
gedy of the commons’ [33] in the cancer population.
In contrast to existing treatments, in which evolution
(of resistance) is undesired, in our method the evo-
lutionary response is what produces the desired ef-
fect; resistance cannot evolve because mutant cells
Figure 4. Effect of cost, type of benefit and number of defective cells. The color of each square in each plot represents the
equilibrium values (frequency of+/+or fitness) as a function of h (the threshold of the benefit function) and c (the cost/benefit
ratio of producing the growth factor), when a group of / cells with radius r is introduced in the population. A large diffusion
range (high d), a steep benefit function (high s), a large cost (c) and a larger initial amount of/ cells (large r) are more likely to
lead to the extinction of the+/+cells. Deterministic update
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that do produce diffusible factors (+/+) have a lower
fitness in a population of —/— cells.
Directly targeting growth factors or their receptors
is a typical approach of modern anti-cancer drugs
(like Avastin). Although it has been suggested that
attacking diffusible factors may be less susceptible
to the evolution of resistance [34–36], the long-term
failure of these drugs shows that this approach does
not work as expected. One of the problems with
therapies that target growth factors directly is that,
as we have seen, when one reduces the amount of
diffusible factor available, although the immediate
result is a sudden reduction in tumor growth (be-
cause the threshold necessary to achieve the original
benefit is not reached), the amount of diffusible fac-
tors necessary for the cells to achieve a certain
benefit increases, which increase the equilibrium fre-
quency of producers. Relapse, therefore, is due to
the fact that the population adjusts to a new equilib-
rium. Complete suppression of circulating growth
factors would produce the desired outcome, but is
difficult to achieve.
Existing gene therapy approaches that target
growth factors are likely to be unstable as well.
Impairing proto-oncogenes using RNAi is unlikely
to work, because it is prone to the evolution of re-
sistance—not different from the effect of a drug that
impairs the product of the proto-oncogenes.
Restoring tumor suppressor genes (like p53) is un-
likely to work in the long term because the modified
cells have a private disadvantage against
nonmodified cells. Existing gene therapy methods
Figure 5. Importance of the diffusion range. The plots show frequencies and fitness over time (the bold line is the average of 10
simulations) and the lattices show the population after 1000 generations per cell. If the diffusible factor has a short diffusion
range (d)/ cells and+/+cells can coexist under conditions that, with a larger diffusion range, will lead to the extinction of the
+/+cells. Deterministic update, s= 20, h = 0.5, c = 0.1
168 | Archetti Evolution, Medicine, and Public Health
 by guest on A
ugust 5, 2013
http://em
ph.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
could only work if they were able to target all the cells
in the tumor. It is not surprising that most of the
efforts in the field of RNAi are devoted to the prob-
lem of efficient delivery [6].
An approach that seems more promising in the
light of evolutionary dynamics is the use of shRNA to
silence genes for growth factors. Although this looks
similar to our method of using / cells, silenced
cells (created in vivo by shRNA given systemically via
a plasmid embedded in a delivery system) are differ-
ent from knockout (/) cells because even though
silenced cells do not produce the growth factors,
they produce extra RNA and therefore, unlike our
/ cells, they will not have a selective advantage
over the original cancer cells if the cost of extra
shRNA overcomes the benefit of not producing the
growth factor. Apart from the energetic costs of extra
RNA production [37], which can overcome the bene-
fits of lower protein production, the toxicity of
shRNA due to off-target effects and interference with
endogenous gene silencing (which would be even
more pronounced with multiple knockdowns) is well
known. This and other safety concerns have pre-
vented further major developments with shRNA
[6]. Knockout autologous cells do not have these
toxicity and safety problems.
Autologous cell defection therapy is not without
potential problems. Tumor cells often release
diffusible factors that induce stromal cells (cancer-
associated fibroblasts, endothelial cells,
Figure 6. Temporarily increasing the amount of diffusible factors. The plots show frequencies and fitness over time and the
lattices show snapshots of the population at different times. By providing exogenous diffusible factors (at t2 = 1) the threshold
(h = 0.7) decreases (to h = 0.3) and, as a consequence, the frequency of+/+cells declines toward a new stable internal equilib-
rium. When the provision of exogenous diffusible factors is interrupted (at t3 = 1), the threshold returns to the original value
(h = 0.7); because the fraction of+/+is now below the new (equal to the original) unstable equilibrium,+/+cells will go extinct.
Deterministic update, s = 20, c = 0.1, d= 3
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myofibroblasts and immune/inflammatory cells,
including T- and B-cells, macrophages, neutrophils,
mast cells, mesenchymal stem cells and other bone
marrow-derived cells) to produce other diffusible
factors and these stroma-produced factors also pro-
mote the proliferation of cancer cells [38–40]. A pos-
sible problem with the autologous cell therapy
proposed here, therefore, might be that, even if /
 cells go to fixation within the tumor, diffusible
factors provided by the stroma may still enable the
tumor to grow. The stroma, however, produces dif-
fusible factors that improve tumor fitness only when
induced (‘activated’) to do so by signals released by
the tumor itself. The ‘signals’ are diffusible factors
themselves produced by the cancer cells (usually
growth factors that may be the same or different
from the diffusible factors released in response by
the stromal cells). Their dynamics are the same as
for diffusible factors that affect the fitness of tumor
cells directly (without interactions with the stroma);
indeed, stroma-produced diffusible factors are even
more ‘public’ goods than the growth factors
produced by the tumor cells (which will, with a cer-
tain degree, act as private goods for the producing
cells). The fact that the stroma produces diffusible
factors in response to signals from the tumor, there-
fore, does not seem to represent a serious obstacle
to the use of autologous defective.
A more serious problem may arise if the tumor
has mutations that make a diffusible factor recep-
tor, or its downstream signal transduction path-
way (that leads to the regulation of gene
expression), constitutively active. In this case,
the cancer cell is effectively independent from that
diffusible factor. Such mutations are known to be
responsible for the failure of drugs that target
growth factor receptors like Herceptin and
Erbitux [41]. Autologous defective cell therapy
would be ineffective as well if the knockout pro-
cess is limited to a single diffusible factor for
which the cell has a constitutively active receptor
(or signal transduction pathway). However, the
(autologous) / cells will themselves have a
constitutive receptor for that diffusible factor,
and therefore, still have an advantage against
+/+ cells due to the lack of production cost for
the diffusible factor. More importantly, the use of
/ cells will still be effective if multiple diffus-
ible factor genes are knocked out, unless the ori-
ginal +/+ cells are constitutively active for all
diffusible factor receptors, which is unlikely. It is
more likely that a downstream signal (like Ras)
common to different receptors may be constitu-
tively active. Such downstream signals, however,
will have only a specific fitness effect (e.g. stimu-
late cell proliferation), whereas growth factors
generally have multiple effects (e.g. cell prolifer-
ation, protection against apoptosis or against
immune system reaction).
Autologous cell defection therapy is proposed
here mainly as a method for treating primary,
nonmetastatic tumors that can be directly accessed
by cell injection, and seems inherently inadequate
against metastatic cancer. One could speculate,
however, that by injecting / cells systemically
(through the bloodstream originating from the site
of the primary tumor) it might be possible to reach
the sites of the metastases and therefore even treat
metastatic cancer. Clearly, injecting cancer cells sys-
temically makes sense under the assumption that
/ cells are only able to grow in the presence of
other+/+cancer cells, that is, at sites of metastasis;
here the / cells will have the same selective ad-
vantage and lead to the same effect described for
primary tumors. Finally, the method relies on the
fact that cells compete with each other, which may
not be the case in the early stages of the tumor,
during the initial growth of metastases or if cells
do not divide rapidly.
Although the concept of autologous cell defection
is grounded in evolutionary game theory, the path
from the theory to actual medical applications is
clearly a long one. Cancer dynamics is a much more
complex process than the one described here [42]. In
order to provide more precise estimates, the
methods used here could be extended to take into
account, for example, three-dimensional Voronoi
graphs rather than regular two-dimensional lattices.
The benefit of the diffusible factor produced by a cell
should depend on the distance from the producing
cell, on the type of tissue and diffusible factor and on
the developmental stage of the tumor. Further the-
ory and experimental validation of the method will be
reported shortly.
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